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CONSTRAINING POPULISM: THE REAL
CHALLENGE OF INITIATIVE REFORM
Kenneth P. Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION
At a recent meeting of the California Assembly Speaker's
Commission on the Initiative Process, a group whose mission
was to study and propose initiative reforms, Commissioner
William Hauck asked his fellow commissioners to step back
and focus on some bottom-line questions:
What are we trying to do here? What are the basic
objectives we're trying to get at? Are we trying to reduce
the number of ballot measures we see every two years, or
to increase the number of ballot measures? Are we trying
to bring lawmaking more back into the legislative process
or do we want to permit it to be expanded on the ballot?1
The Commission could never fully resolve these questions,
because the commissioners held deeply conflicting views. The
Commission included current and former legislators, agency
officials and "good government" types who support reforms
that would constrain California's state-wide initiative
process, but it also included initiative entrepreneurs who seek
to protect the process or even expand it. As the Commission
completes its work, the reform debate-and these basic
underlying disagreements-will continue.
This article argues that, in California, the goal of
initiative reform should be to make it harder to enact
* Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, University of
California, Berkeley; J.D., Harvard University; B.A., Pomona College. The
author would like to thank Professor Bruce E. Cain and the staff of the Institute
of Governmental Studies at U.C. Berkeley for their assistance.
1. Commissioner William Hauck, Comments at the Public Meeting of the
Speaker's Commission on the California Initiative Process (Dec. 18, 2000). For
information on the Commission's work, see its web page (visited June 1, 2001)
<http://www.cainitiative.org>.
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sweeping policy change through the state direct initiative
process.2 More specifically, reforms should seek to constrain
what I call "Populist-oriented" initiative lawmaking, and
reclaim a more "Progressive-oriented" vision of direct
democracy.
To understand why I frame this discussion of initiative
reform in these terms, it is important to recognize that there
are two distinct, competing views of the initiative process, the
"Progressive" conception and the "Populist" conception.3
These competing conceptions date back over a century, to the
origins of California's initiative process. The initiative is
often characterized as Progressive reform because it was
introduced in California and many other states during the
Progressive Era of the early twentieth century.4 However, the
Populists, not the Progressives, were the first ones to agitate
for direct democracy at the end of the nineteenth century in
California and elsewhere.5 Although both Populists and
Progressives wanted to introduce direct democracy, they had
very different reasons for doing so and different conceptions
of how these mechanisms should be used.6 These historical
distinctions matter because the two conceptions continue to
exist, and they underlie the current debate over whether the
initiative process needs to be reformed, and if so, in what
manner.
This article distinguishes between the two competing
conceptions of the initiative process and argues that the
2. In this article, I limit my discussion to statewide initiative lawmaking.
Many cities and counties in California (and in other states) provide mechanisms
for direct legislation. Local initiative lawmaking creates its own set of concerns,
some of which are similar to those raised by the statewide process. Issues
unique to local initiatives fall outside the scope of this discussion.
3. For further discussion of this distinction, see Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth
P. Miller, The Populist Legacy: Initiatives and the Undermining of
Representative Government, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY?: THE BATTLE OVER
INITIATIVES IN AMERICA (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001).
4. California adopted the initiative, referendum, and recall in 1911. See
infra note 17 and accompanying text. Twenty-two states adopted the initiative
or referendum (or both) between 1898 and 1918. See THOMAS E. CRONIN,
DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL
51 (1989); see also DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 38-40 (1984).
5. See CRONIN, supra note 4, at 43-59; see also Nathaniel A. Persily, The
Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum and
Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL. SCI. REV. 11 (1997).
6. See CRONIN, supra note 4, at 43-59.
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Populist conception has prevailed-with respect to both
process and substance. As a result, the process bypasses and
undermines representative government, rather than
supplementing and improving it. Many modern-day
Progressives are disenchanted with the initiative process and
seek through reforms to constrain its Populist
characteristics. Indeed, many ideas for reforming
California's initiative process have "constraining" effects.
Such reforms face an uphill fight, however, given the broad
popular support for the initiative process and the continuing
public distrust of representative government. In light of
these difficulties, it may fall to the California Supreme Court
to place constraints on Populist-oriented initiative
lawmaking, through stricter application of the California
Constitution's rules governing the initiative process, such as
the single subject rule and the no-revision rule.8 However,
since the burden on courts to check the initiative process is
already heavy, reformers should continue to do what they can
to constrain the process by other, non-judicial, means. In
sum, reforms to constrain the Populist-orientation of the
California initiative, though hard to achieve, are necessary
and worth fighting for.
II. DUELING CONCEPTIONS OF DIRECT DEMOCACY: POPULIST
V. PROGRESSIVE
Both of the terms, "Populist" and "Progressive," refer to
political movements in specific historical moments just before
and just after the turn of the last century, respectively, but
they also describe longer-term, often competing, impulses
within American political culture.
The historical political movement called "Populism"
emerged in the latter decades of the nineteenth century.9 It
was a protest movement by political outsiders, composed
mostly of distressed farmers, but also laborers, ranchers, and
7. See, e.g., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA: A LEGACY LOST?: A STUDY UPDATE OF DIRECT
LEGISLATION IN CALIFORNIA FROM PROGRESSIVE HOPES TO CURRENT REALITY
(1998).
8. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d), art. XVIII; see also infra note 17 and
accompanying text.
9. For a classic history of the Populist movement, see JOHN D. HICKS, THE
POPULIST REVOLT: A HISTORY OF THE FARMERS' ALLIANCE AND THE PEOPLE'S
PARTY (1931).
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debtors of all types. Populists" were a factious coalition but
agreed on three fundamental points: 1) the government needs
to combat private economic power, which profits at the
expense of the common person, but 2) it cannot be trusted to
do so, and thus, 3) the "people" must gain control of the
government. That last principle led them to advocate, almost
obsessively, direct legislation. For many Populists, adoption
of the mechanisms of direct democracy overshadowed nearly
every other issue."
For a time, Populists sought to organize advocacy
organizations (such as the non-partisan Farmers' Alliance)
and work for change within existing political structures.
Largely frustrated in these efforts, however, Populists lashed
out at the government, founded a third party, the "People's
party," drafted a series of platforms, fielded candidates for
office, and agitated for direct democracy." The "Populist Era"
made an especially large impact in the western states. In
California, Populist distrust of government at all levels,
especially the legislature, influenced the drafting of the
state's 1879 Constitution. 3 Drafters incorporated into the
document many specific provisions that would normally be
considered "ordinary policy," thus restricting the legislature's
discretion. 4 In addition, it was during the Populist Era that
10. The term "Populist" was first used in the early 1890s as an epithet
against the People's party and its members, but party adherents gradually came
to accept it. See id. at 238.
11. See id. at 406-08.
12. Populist candidates enjoyed a measure of success in the elections of
1892 and 1894, capturing numerous state and local offices, seats in Congress,
and electoral votes for the presidency. After 1896, however, when Populists
endorsed the ill-fated candidacy of the Democratic presidential nominee,
William Jennings Bryan, the party's fault lines emerged, and it quickly
disintegrated as an independent party and coherent political movement. See id.
at 378-79.
13. Professor Hans A. Linde notes that antipathy toward the California
legislature was so strong that some members of the 1879 Constitutional
Convention wanted to abolish the legislature entirely. See Hans A. Linde, Who
Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 709, 718
(1994).
14. See Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the
Initiative Power in California, 31 LOY. L. REV. 1165, 1183-84 (1998). Examples
of "ordinary policies" inserted in the 1879 Constitution include a requirement
that the legislature protects the state from the presence of aliens, see CAL.
CONST. of 1879, art. XIX, § 1 (1879), rules governing the adoption of textbooks
by local school boards, see id. art IX, § 7, and a prohibition on lotteries, see id.
art. IV, § 26. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF CALIFORNIA (1879).
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demand for direct democracy first emerged in California. In
the 1890s, Dr. John Randolph Haynes, leader of the Direct
Legislation League of California (which had ties to the
Populist Party) was agitating for the adoption of the
initiative, referendum, and recall in California.15 By the turn
of the century, Populism dissipated as an organized party and
political movement, but by then it had already influenced the
future direction of California politics and government.
The Progressive movement followed closely thereafter,
and flourished during the first two decades of the twentieth
century. Progressivism was a reform movement that brought
together a coalition of earnest reformers including liberal
urban clergy, social workers, suffragettes, academics,
"muckraking" journalists, and civic-minded professionals,
who wanted to address social problems created by
industrialization, urbanization, immigration, and other
dislocating forces." In their view, an enlightened,
professionalized government was indispensable, but
government needed to be reformed to carry out its role.
Progressives believed that corrupt party bosses, allied with
increasingly powerful and selfish corporate interests, had
seized control of representative government, especially
legislatures, and were using government to retard social
progress. It was imperative, they believed, to liberate
representative government from these corrupt forces so that
it might become an effective instrument for social reform.
The Progressive strategy for restructuring and reforming
representative government was several-fold. On the one
hand, Progressives sought to make government more
responsive and accountable to the electorate through
15. In 1903, Los Angeles became the first city in the state to adopt the
initiative, referendum, and recall. Dr. Haynes continued to advocate for
adoption of direct democracy (at both the local and state level) during the
Progressive period. For a discussion of early efforts to introduce direct
democracy in California, see V.0. KEY, JR. & WINSTON W. CROUCH, THE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 423-31 (1939); CALIFORNIA
COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 39 (1992) [hereinafter
CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING].
16. See generally ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR., PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICA: A
STUDY OF THE ERA FROM THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO WOODROW WILSON (1974).
For a general discussion of distinctions between Populists and Progressives, see
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 131-34
(1955).
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expanded suffrage, direct primaries, and direct election of
senators, as well as through the new mechanisms of
initiative, referendum, and recall, but they also sought to
strengthen and professionalize government by establishing
professional bureaucracies, non-partisan commissions, strong
city managers, and the like. In California, a leading
Progressive, Hiram Johnson, was elected governor in 1910 on
a platform to break the Southern Pacific Railroad's
stranglehold on the state legislature. As part of his program,
he persuaded Californians in a special election in 1911 to
adopt the initiative, referendum, and recall." The
mechanisms of direct democracy were part of the California
Progressives' comprehensive package of twenty-three
constitutional amendments designed to strengthen and
improve representative government. Other provisions
established women's suffrage, expanded the state court
system, created an independent railroad commission,
increased the state's power to regulate public utilities, and
improved the state's capacity to inspect and ensure the
quality of food and merchandise.'" Unlike the Populists, the
Progressives respected representative government and sought
to use the initiative in coordination with other reforms to
enhance government's responsiveness, administrative
competence, and expertise.
The Populist and Progressive movements continue to
operate in new guises in California and elsewhere. Their
enduring characteristics can be summarized as follows. The
Populist impulse, first of all, is essentially individualistic: it
is driven by individual self-interest, by the common person's
aspiration for political equality and social and economic
17. See CAL. CONST. amends. 22, 23 (Special Election 1911). Senate
Constitutional Amendment (SCA) 22 (Initiative and Referendum) was approved
76% to 24% (168,744 Yes to 52,093 No); SCA 23 (Recall) was approved 77% to
23% (178,115 Yes to 53,755 No). See SECRETARY OF STATE FRANK C. JORDAN,
SUMMARY OF AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF CALIFORNIA (1883-1920)
9-10 (1921).
18. See JORDAN, supra note 17, at 9-11; see also KEVIN STARR, INVENTING
THE DREAM: CALIFORNIA THROUGH THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 254-59 (1985)(describing the California Progressives' range of reforms between 1910 and
1913, all of which were designed to enhance state government's effectiveness
and professionalism). During the same period, another leading Progressive,
Woodrow Wilson, maintained that Progressive advocates of initiative
lawmaking had no intention of undermining representative processes, but
rather wanted to redeem them. See CRONIN, supra note 4, at 54.
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opportunity. Populism is also democratic, in that it assumes
that common people are trustworthy and competent-given a
chance, they will make wise choices. Most importantly,
Populism is anti-establishment: it distrusts concentration of
power in the hands of elites, either in the private sector or in
government. By contrast, the Progressive impulse is
moralistic, in that Progressives want to reform government
and society. It is also optimistic, holding great faith that
well-run institutions can effect social progress. Finally,
Progressivism is elitist, in that it wants to invest power in
well-trained professional experts.
Populists distrust representative government and seek to
constrain it by, among other things, cutting taxes, capping
spending, imposing term limits on elected officials, and
locking in constitutional limits on policy choices. Moreover,
Populists embrace an unconstrained initiative process,
seeking (to the extent possible) to substitute direct popular
control for representative government. Examples of today's
Populists include U.S. Term Limits and various tax-
limitation organizations.
Progressives, by contrast, like government, so long as it is
"clean," efficient, and focused on achieving public goods. They
believe the mechanisms of direct democracy are useful only
insofar as they "redeem" representative government. While
Progressives sometimes disapprove of the mediating role
parties and corporate interests play in government, as a rule
they do not believe that the public can govern without
mediation. Instead, they believe in the importance of
expertise and administrative competence. Contemporary
Progressives include "good government" groups like Common
Cause and the League of Women Voters.
The historical record is clear that both Populists and
Progressives sought introduction of the initiative process but
had different motivations for doing so. Progressives wanted
the initiative, referendum, and recall to serve as an
additional check on representative government, one tool
among many to improve the government's quality and
effectiveness. Populists, however, had a more radical vision.
They sought to use the initiative power to undermine
representative government and shift power to the people
themselves.
Populists and Progressives provided two approaches to
104320011
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direct democracy. Under the Progressives, direct democracy
would not constitute a "fourth branch" of government with co-
equal or even greater power than the other three branches
but rather a supplementary and corrective check on the
tripartite Madisonian scheme. Perhaps the closest
approximation to the Progressive vision of direct democracy
can be found in the state of Washington. The Washington
State Constitution permits initiative lawmaking, but in a
more constrained way that does not undermine the
legislature to the same degree that California's Populist-
based initiative process allows. Citizens in Washington caninitiate statutes either by an "initiative to the legislature" or
by an "initiative to the people." 9 "Initiative to the legislature"
is another name for the indirect initiative. It is a mechanism
whereby citizens draft a proposed law, and if they gather
enough petitions, the proposal is formally presented to the
legislature. At that point, the legislature holds hearings on
the measure and has the opportunity to adopt it. If it chooses
to do so, the measure becomes law."0 If the legislature fails to
adopt the measure, it then goes on the ballot, but the
legislature may also submit an alternative. The voters are
then able to adopt one of the alternatives, or reject both.2 '
Citizens in Washington also have the option of proposing
an initiative directly to the voters, without first going to the
legislature. Importantly, all voter-approved initiatives in
Washington State, direct or indirect, are subject to legislative
amendment or repeal. If the legislature seeks to amend aninitiative within two years of passage, it must muster a two-
thirds vote in both houses. After two years, the initiative
may be amended or repealed by majority vote, just like any
other law.2 In addition, Washington State does not allow
19. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1. For a detailed discussion of Washington'sinitiative process, see Jeffrey T. Even, Direct Democracy in Washington: ADiscourse on the People's Power of Initiative and Referendum, 32 GONZ. L. REV.
247 (1996-97).
20. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1(a).
21. See id.
22. Article II, section 1(c) of the Washington Constitution reads as follows:
No act, law, or bill approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon
shall be amended or repealed by the legislature within a period of twoyears following such enactment: Provided, that any such act, law, orbill may be amended within two years after such enactment at any
regular or special session of the legislature by two-thirds of all the
members elected to each house with full compliance with section 12,
1044
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citizen initiated constitutional amendments." All
constitutional amendments must originate in the legislature.
As a result of these features, initiative proponents in
Washington cannot lock in policies either through
constitutional amendments or unamendable statutes. This
model supplements Madisonian republican structures by
allowing for additional popular input, but constrains the
ability of Populist forces to undermine representative
24government.
California, however, has adopted a different approach.
III. THE POPULIST VICTORY AND THE PROBLEMS IT CAUSES
In California, the Populist conception of direct democracy
has prevailed. The roots of that triumph can be found in the
original structures of California's initiative process, as
amended into the state constitution in 1911, but the
magnitude of the victory has become fully apparent only in
the last three decades.
A. Structural Factors
Unlike Washington, but similar to many other initiative
states, California's initiative process allows citizens to amend
Article III, of the Washington Constitution, and no amendatory law
adopted in accordance with this provision shall be subject to
referendum. But such enactment may be amended or repealed at any
general or special election by direct vote of the people thereon.
23. See id. art. II, § 41. Although the Washington Constitution provides for
statutory initiatives only, some Washington initiative advocates have
nevertheless argued that the constitution can be amended by initiative as well.
The Washington State Supreme Court, however, has consistently rejected that
view. See, e.g., Gerberding v. Munro, 949 P.2d 1366, 1377; see also Even, supra
note 19, at 268, 270.
24. Perhaps in part as a result of these structural features, initiative
lawmaking in Washington State has adhered more closely to the Progressive
ideal than in some other states. Washington is a relatively "high use" initiative
state; in the history of the process, only four states (Oregon, California, North
Dakota, and Colorado) have adopted more statewide initiatives. See Initiative
and Referendum Institute Historical Database (visited May 21, 2001)
<http'J/www.iandrinstitute.org>. At least until very recently, however,
Washington's experience with initiative lawmaking has avoided Populist excess.
The rise in Washington of initiative entrepreneurs such as Tim Eyman,
proponent of Populist-oriented tax limitation measures 1-695 of 1999 and 1-722
of 2000, indicate the state's initiative process may be headed in a more Populist
direction, but the structural constraints on the process discussed here will
prevent the Washington initiative process from becoming as Populist as
initiative lawmaking in California.
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the state constitution directly with virtually no input from
representative government. Through initiative constitutional
amendments, citizens can completely bypass the legislature
and-by a simple majority vote-enshrine temporary policy
preferences into the state's fundamental charter.25 As noted
above, the state's current constitution, ratified during the
Populist Era, originally contained many provisions that
normally would be considered "statutory" rather than
"constitutional" in nature.26 This ploy was motivated by
distrust for representative government and was designed to
remove certain policy matters from the legislature's control.
California's initiative constitutional amendment process
allows the electorate to amend the constitution at will 27-and
to "constitutionalize" policy choices so that they remain off-
limits to legislative change, absent subsequent voter
approval.
California's initiative process goes a step further than all
other initiative states, however, by preventing post-
enactment legislative amendment of statutory initiatives.28
Unlike Washington State, which allows the legislature to
25. See Bruce E. Cain et al., Constitutional Change: Is It Too Easy to Amend
Our State Constitution?, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING
STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 265 (Bruce E. Cain &Roger G. Noll eds., 1995). The authors contrast the California Constitution's
ease of amendability with the difficulty in amending the federal Constitution,
and attribute the high rate of amendment in part to the specificity of the state
constitution. They note that while legislative constitutional amendments (LCA)
are far more frequent than initiative constitutional amendments (ICA), the ICAprocess makes it relatively easy for the initiative electorate to lock in fiscal
decisions and other policy preferences into the state constitution.
26. See id. at 276-77.
27. One constraint is the state constitution's rule that the initiative process
may only be used to "amend" not "revise" the constitution. See CAL. CONST. art.XVIII. The state supreme court has generally been lax in its enforcement ofthis rule. See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. ofEqualization, 22 Cal. 3d 208 (1978) (upholding Proposition 13 of 1978 against a
challenge that it violated, among other things, the no-revision rule); Brosnahan
v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236 (1982) (upholding Proposition 8 of 1982, a "victim's
rights" initiative, against a similar challenge); Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492(1991) (upholding Proposition 140 of 1990, the term limits initiative, against a
similar challenge). An exception is Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990),
which invalidated in part Proposition 115 of 1990, a criminal justice initiative,
for impermissibly "revising" the state's constitution.
28. Arizona limits legislative post-election amendments to initiatives, but
only when the initiative receives a majority of all registered voters. See ARIZ.CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6). Since this has never happened in practice,
California is the only state that restricts the legislature in this way.
1046
CONSTRAINING POPULISM
amend or repeal an initiative by a two-thirds vote in the two
years after the initiative is approved and by a simple majority
vote thereafter, California permits no legislative amendment
of statutory initiatives without voter approval, unless the
initiative itself makes provision for it.29 This rule is clearly
motivated by distrust of the legislature, and it in fact ties the
legislature's hands in much the same way that
constitutionalizing policy choices does. Thus, in California,
both initiative constitutional amendments and initiative
statutes undermine the authority and flexibility of
representative government.
Unlike Washington and nine other initiative states,
California currently does not offer proponents the option to
pursue an indirect initiative." At the time the state adopted
the initiative process, it included the indirect initiative. The
indirect option was little-used, however. The Constitution
Revision Commission of the 1960s unfortunately decided to
abolish the indirect initiative, and it was removed from the
constitution as part of the revisions adopted in 1966.3"
Structurally, then, the California initiative process is
weighted toward the Populist conception of direct democracy.
The rules bypass the legislature altogether in the enactment
of initiatives and prevent the legislature from amending
initiatives after they are adopted. The process clearly can be
a powerful weapon in Populists' hands.
For many years, however, Populists made little use of the
initiative device. A review of history shows that use of the
direct initiative in California forms a V-shaped curve. There
was a flurry of initiative activity during the early years of the
29. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 10(c); see also Beneficial Loan Soc'y v. Haight,
215 Cal. 506 (1932) (invalidating a 1931 statute for conflicting with the 1918
Usury Act, adopted by initiative). The court reaffirmed that acts of the
legislature may not conflict with an initiative statute, unless specific provision
has been made to that effect.
30. The following states provide for the indirect initiative: Alaska, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. See M. Dane Waters, Testimony to the Speaker's Commission on the
California Initiative Process (Dec. 18, 2000).
31. A rationale for this decision was that the mission of the 1960s
Constitutional Revision Commission was, in part, to delete "superfluous"
provisions from the bloated state constitution. Because the indirect initiative
had been so infrequently used (only four indirect initiatives had been qualified
to the legislature in over a half-century), it seemed to be a constitutional
surplusage. Interview with Fred Silva, Executive Director of the 1990s
Constitution Revision Commission (Feb. 16, 2001).
10472001]
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process from 1912 to 1934.32 Most of these early initiatives
were Progressive-oriented in substance, in keeping with the
mood of the times. By mid-century, initiative use declined in
California, perhaps in part due to increased public confidence
in representative government. In 1966, for example,
Californians overwhelmingly approved a recommendation of a
blue-ribbon Constitutional Revision Commission to change
the constitution to create a full-time, professional
legislature. The constitutional revisions and accompanying
reforms provided for regular annual sessions; removed the
120 days-per-session limit; increased the budget for
legislative staff; provided for staff specifically assigned to the
legislative leadership and the party caucuses; and provided
for non-partisan research staff (which led to the formation of
32. See SECRETARY OF STATE BILL JONES, A HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA
INITIATIVE PROCESS 16-25 (1996).
33. The Constitutional Revision, designated on the ballot as Proposition la,
was approved by the legislature in 1966 as ACA 13 after Governor Edmund G.
"Pat" Brown gave it his support. See generally Eugene C. Lee, The Revision of
California's Constitution, 3 CPS Brief, California Policy Seminar 3-6 (Apr.
1991). The proposal made numerous changes to the state constitution, most
notably creating a full-time, professional legislature. The ballot argument in
favor of the proposal stressed the importance of "effective" government:
One of our most crucial needs in this time is effective government-
based on a modern Constitution .... California's constitution is hardly
modern. It is the third longest Constitution in the world and it has
been amended over 300 times since 1879. In short, it is a mess. In
1962, by more than a 2-1 vote, the people mandated modernization of
their Constitution. As a result, a blue-ribbon Constitution Revision
Commission of 69 leading Californians was appointed to recommend a
revised Constitution. These prominent citizens from all walks of life
worked without pay for three years and spent thousands of hours at
their task. The result is Proposition 1-a .... The reforms of
Proposition 1-a have been labeled by party leaders and non-partisan
groups alike as essential to the effective operation of government....
State government today faces new challenges and new responsibilities
not dreamed of in 1879. This new Constitution helps to meet these
challenges by making government itself more flexible and able to do thejob which our citizens have a right to expect. If states are to survive
and prosper in our system, they need the tools of effective government.
SECRETARY OF STATE FRANK M. JORDAN, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: PROPOSITIONS AND PROPOSED LAWS TOGETHER WITH
ARGUMENTS, GENERAL ELECTION 1-2 (1966) [hereinafter PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS]. The ballot argument in favor of Proposition la was signed by
both Democratic Governor Brown and his Republican challenger that year,
Ronald Reagan. See id. at 1. California voters overwhelmingly approved the
changes, by a vote of 4,156,416 Yes to 1,499,675 No (75%--25%). See SECRETARY
OF STATE FRANK M. JORDAN, CALIFORNIA STATEMENT OF THE VOTE, GENERAL
ELECTION 35 (1966).
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the highly-regarded Senate and Assembly Offices of
Research). 4 Adoption of the professional legislature was a
high-water mark of Californians' Progressive-oriented
support for expert representative government.35 Significantly,
during this period, the state's citizens showed little interest in
initiative lawmaking; they approved only five initiatives
during the entire 1950s and 1960s.36
During the 1970s, however, Californians grew
increasingly distrustful of representative government.37 This
shift in the public's attitude toward government created
conditions necessary for the great Populist achievement,
Proposition 13 of 1978, the initiative that slashed property
taxes and required voter approval for future tax increases.
The campaign for Proposition 13 played on Populist
resentments, not only about taxes, but also about
representative government. The Yes-on-13 ballot argument
proclaimed: "More than 15 percent of all government
spending is wasted! Wasted on huge pensions for politicians
which sometimes approach $80,000 per year! Wasted on
limousines for elected officials or taxpayer paid junkets. Now
we have the opportunity to trade waste for property tax
relief!"38 The success of Proposition 13, in turn, displayed the
awesome power of the initiative to make immediate,
wholesale, and lasting change. 9 The possibilities did not go
34. See Margie Lloyd, California's Golden Moment: The Last Opportunity to
Heal Constitutional Ills, in CALIFORNIA POLITICS AND POLICY 49 (1996); see also
Peverill Squire, The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California
Assembly, 54 J. POL. 1026-53 (1992). The Senate Office of Research still exists,
but the Assembly Office of Research did not survive the budget cuts following
Proposition 140 of 1990.
35. These changes helped make California's legislature the most respected
in the nation. See WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., LEGISLATURE: CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOL
FOR POLITICS 13 (1982) (citing a 1971 study of the Citizen's Conference on State
Legislatures). Professor Muir's book provides an excellent account of how the
California legislature operated in the decade after the 1960s reforms.
36. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 27-31.
37. See 6 THE FIELD INSTITUTE, CALIFORNIA OPINION INDEX: A DIGEST
DESCRIBING THE PUBLIC'S CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS (1981). The report
showed a decline in Californians' confidence in the state legislature throughout
the 1970s, bottoming out in 1978.
38. Argument of John V. Briggs in Favor of Proposition 13, in CALIFORNIA
VOTERS PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION, June 6, 1978.
39. See PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE,
AMERICA'S FUTURE 188-99 (1998) (discussing Proposition 13's catalytic effect on
the initiative process). Schrag argues:
[T]here's no doubt that ... it was [Proposition 13 proponents] Howard
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unnoticed, and initiative lawmaking exploded. A simple
graph demonstrates the sharp increase in initiative
lawmaking over the past four decades."0
Figure 1: California Initiative Lawmaking, 1960-1999
30
2524
20-
15 - [Number of Voter-
Approved Initiatives
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
One might reasonably ask: Isn't this a good thing?
Doesn't the sharp increase in initiative lawmaking
demonstrate that over the past couple of decades Californians
have enjoyed a unique opportunity to participate in the
democratic process? And isn't this system certainly "more
democratic" than the representative system-and therefore
an improvement? Although this perspective seems appealing
at first glance, since who wants to argue against the people's
right to decide, a closer examination suggests that initiative
Jarvis and Paul Gann who started the modern plebiscitary cycle and
inaugurated California's new political era.... Proposition 13 not only
spawned the network of consultants, direct mail specialists, and other
business compromising what some people now call, with only minor
exaggeration, California's "Initiative Industrial Complex," but
prompted a seismic shift in the state's political center of gravity, as
well.
Id. at 188-89. See also DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE
CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY 6 (2000) ("The modern-day romance
with the initiative began on June 6, 1978, when two old geezers restructured
California government and arguably changed the course of public policy across
the nation.").
40. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 28-69 (updated to
include 1998).
1050 [Vol. 41
CONSTRAINING POPULISM
lawmaking-at least in its current Populist-oriented form-
gives cause for concern. First, the process of Populist-oriented
initiative lawmaking is not necessarily "more democratic"
than the representative system, if one conceives of
"democracy" as not just "majority rule" but instead a process
that includes a range of democratic norms. Second, the
substance of Populist-oriented initiative lawmaking tends to
undermine representative government and impose
majoritarian values at the expense of minority rights. In our
constitutional system, these substantive outcomes often give
rise to post-election legal challenges, which frequently result
in judicial invalidation of voter-approved initiatives-a chain
of events that is hardly optimal."
B. Process Concerns
A well-functioning democratic system not only aggregates
preferences, it also provides opportunities for refinement of
proposals, informed deliberation, consensus-building, and
compromise. A reasonably functional legislature tends to
maximize these opportunities, but the initiative process does
not.42
In contrast to the often slow, careful, iterative, and
compromise-oriented nature of legislative action, the
initiative process is what political scientists V.0. Key, Jr. and
Winston W. Crouch called a "battering ram."43 In order to
make major changes quickly, the initiative process
substitutes the legislature's elaborate system of checks and
balances with much more direct lawmaking. Bypassing
checks and balances can in fact help produce major policy
breakthroughs in an expedited way, but these benefits come
at a cost.
At the "front end" of the policy process, the initiative
system has two primary features that undermine democratic
values: 1) proponents have absolute control of the framing
and drafting of the measure; and 2) measures are fixed and
unamendable at an early stage of the process.44 Initiative
41. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
42. See MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 180-84.
43. KEY & CROUCH, supra note 15, at 458.
44. Once an initiative petition is submitted for circulation, amendments to
the initiative's text are prohibited. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN
FINANCING, supra note 15, at 79. In Oregon, by contrast, during the circulation
stage, proponents may make amendments that do not "substantially change the
105120011
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proponents are accountable to no one,45 and routinely exclude
the measure's opponents and other interested parties from
their decisions on how to draft the measure's language."
There are no open meeting laws, public notice requirements,
hearings to solicit public input, or other guarantees to give
the press and public access to the drafting and editing stages
of the initiative policy-making process. Instead, measures
simply "appear" in final form at the titling and circulation
stage. After they have finished drafting, proponents file the
measure with the attorney general's office, which prepares a
title and summary, but again no one involved in that process
has the power to amend the proposal. Proponents then
circulate the measure to gather sufficient signatures to place
it on the ballot. At that point, the measure cannot be
amended again, even by the proponents, even if it becomes
apparent that the measure contains a flaw that should be
corrected.
These characteristics of the initiative process
shortchange deliberation and refinement. By permitting
opponents and other interested parties to be excluded from
the drafting process, the initiative system limits input
regarding the proposed measure's legality and practical
implications. The closed process also limits consideration of
other, perhaps more optimal, alternatives. In addition, the
restrictions on amendment after circulation prevent
opportunities to address flaws and refine the measure. As a
result, the nature of the initiative lawmaking makes it more
likely that the end-product will be seriously flawed.
substance of the measure." OR. REV. STAT. § 250.045 (1999).
45. Accountability is a separate, and important, democratic norm which the
initiative process violates. For example, unlike the legislative process, the
initiative process contains no conflict-of-interest prohibitions. Indeed, many
initiatives are proposed by groups that want to line their own pockets, and there
is nothing to restrict them from doing so. See Cain & Miller, supra note 3, at
45-46.
46. For a description of initiative proponents' strategy, see JIM SCHULTZ,
THE INITIATIVE COOKBOOK: RECIPES AND STORIES FROM CALIFORNIA'S BALLOT
WARS (1996).
47. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 15, at 79-
91 (citing several types of flaws that often plague initiatives, including
ambiguous or imprecise terminology, omissions or oversights, excessive length,
complicated wording, and unconstitutional provisions); see also Richard B.
Collins & Dale Oesterle, Governing by Initiative: Structuring the Ballot
Initiative: Procedures that Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 76-77
(1995).
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Moreover, by limiting the opportunities for opponents
and other interested parties to participate in the process, the
initiative system makes compromise and consensus-building
less necessary than in the legislature. In the initiative
process, opponents have no leverage to force amendments or
compromise. If the proponents are confident that their
proposal can win a simple majority of the electorate, they can
ignore their opponents' interests with impunity and instead
draft the initiative in a way that most directly serves their
own interests. There is no need to build a large consensus in
order to win approval of an initiative-50 percent-plus-one
will do,-even if the majority is relatively apathetic and the
minority intense. In allowing proponents to eschew
compromise and accommodation of competing interests, the
initiative process fosters polarization rather than consensus-
building.48
In addition, during the "public" stage of the process, there
is serious doubt whether voters are capable of making
informed decisions regarding initiatives, especially complex
ones that have wide-ranging impact. Polling data indicate
that voters are grossly ignorant of the content of initiative
measures.49 Studies by political scientists Arthur Lupia ° and
Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan" show that to some extent
voters are able to compensate for their lack of information in
initiative campaigns by relying on elite endorsements and
other "cues." Even if voters can rely on such shortcuts,
however, the process by its nature limits their deliberative
options. Voters cannot vote on alternative bills nor attempt
to amend the proposed legislation to make it more acceptable;
48. Indeed, initiative proponents often seek polarization. Jim Schultz notes:
"For many initiative campaigns the basic strategy comes down to two main
tasks. First, make the initiative controversial so that the public is paying
attention. Second, define the sides so you are the good guys and the other side
is evil incarnate." SCHULTZ, supra note 46, at 7.
49. See Elisabeth R. Gerber, Prospects for Reforming the Initiative Process,
in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY?: THE BATTLE OVER INITIATIVES IN AMERICA, supra
note 3 (citing THE FIELD INSTITUTE, THE FIELD POLL No. 1909, Oct. 31, 1998);
see also MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 139-44 (describing voter ignorance regarding
ballot propositions).
50. Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting
Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63-76
(1994).
51. SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION,
VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY (1998).
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they can only vote "yes," "no," or abstain. As political
scientist David Magleby notes, "For many voters, direct
legislation can be a most inaccurate barometer of their
opinions."52
In sum, it is ironic that initiatives have the reputation of
being a more pure form of democracy" when the process
undermines democratic opportunities and violates procedural
guarantees observed by almost every freely elected legislature
in the world. In important ways, direct democracy is less
"democratic" than the indirect, representative system. The
initiative process could be reformed in ways that address
some of these procedural concerns.54 At present, it is enough
to recognize that the initiative system, as it currently
operates in California, is not as "democratic" as some claim it
to be.
C. Substance Concerns
Does it matter if a state like California decides to make
laws through a process that sacrifices some democratic
values? I would argue that there is an independent value to
the democratic procedures described above. But in addition,
the state's initiative system has facilitated substantive
outcomes that undermine representative government and
impose majoritarian values at the expense of minority rights.
Let us first examine the effect that initiatives have had
on representative government in California. Although the
initiative process has occasionally produced Progressive-
oriented measures that have reinforced and improved
representative government,55 Populist-oriented measures that
undermine representative government have predominated in
52. MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 144.
53. See, e.g., Justice Hugo Black, who during oral argument in Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (striking down California's Proposition 14 of 1964
which sought to restrict the state government's ability to enact fair-housing
laws), expressed his view that the initiative process is "as near to a democracy
as you can get." 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (P. Kurland & G. Casper
eds., 1975).
54. See infra Part IV.
55. One example of a Progressive-oriented measure is Proposition 9 of 1974,
the Political Reform Act, now codified at section 81,000 of the California
Government Code. This Act established the state's Fair Political Practices
Commission and enacted new rules regulating campaign financing, lobbying,
conflicts of interest, and ethics.
1054 [Vol. 41
2001] CONSTRAINING POPULISM 1055
recent years. Over the past quarter century, Californians
have approved a series of initiatives to cut taxes,56 require
voter approval for new taxes,5 7 cap spending,58 earmark
spending,59 cut the legislature's budget,60 and severely limit
terms for elected officials.6' In isolation some of these
measures may have had merit, but combined, they have made
it very difficult for government to address the changing needs
of a big, complex, and heterogeneous state.62 These limits on
government's capacities are especially acute because, as
discussed above, California initiatives (whether constitutional
or statutory) are unamendable absent voter approval and
thus become entrenched.
Along with Proposition 13 of 1978, Proposition 140 of
1990 is a perfect example of Populist-oriented initiative
lawmaking. Driven by distrust of representative government,
particularly the legislature, the measure cut the legislature's
budget by nearly forty percent, forcing wholesale reductions
in staff, and placed very short limits on members' terms:
three two-year terms in the Assembly and two four-year
terms in the Senate. The shortness of the terms magnified
56. See, e.g., Proposition 13 of 1978 (reducing the property tax); Proposition
6 of 1982 (repealing the state's gift and inheritance taxes); Proposition 7 of 1982
(establishing income tax indexing).
57. See, e.g., Proposition 13 of 1978 (requiring voter approval of property tax
increases); Proposition 218 of 1996 (requiring voter approval for local
government taxes).
58. See, e.g., Proposition 4 of 1979 (establishing state spending limit).
59. See, e.g., Proposition 37 of 1984 (earmarking lottery revenues);
Proposition 98 of 1988 (guaranteeing a minimum percentage of the state budget
for education); Proposition 99 of 1988 (earmarking tobacco tax revenues);
Proposition 10 of 1998 (earmarking tobacco tax revenues). Note that not all
legislature-constraining initiatives are sponsored by political conservatives.
The political "left" has also invoked the initiative process to tie the legislature's
hands.
60. See Proposition 140 of 1990 (mandating a cut in the legislature's budget
of approximately 40% and capping future increases).
61. See id. (limiting terms of governor, legislators, and other state
constitutional officers).
62. See generally Elizabeth G. Hill, Ballot Box Budgeting, in EDSOURCE
PUBLICATIONS (1990). Hill noted: "By our estimates, approximately 75 percent
of the state's General Fund expenditure is not subject to legislative control
through the budget process. More than half of this restriction is due to
initiatives ...." Id. at 3. See also Cain et al., supra note 25, at 289 (noting that
"some of the most critical fiscal decisions have been put into the Constitution by
the ICA process, and this has limited the ability of elected officials to deal with
fiscal crises").
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their undermining impact on the legislature. 63 Populists
rightly claim that it is virtually certain California would not
have term limits were it not for the initiative process;
legislators are too self-interested to impose term limits on
themselves.64 However, the initiative process's take-it-or-
leave-it approach and lack of opportunities for compromise
have produced an extreme form of term limitation that has
severely undermined the legislature. Proposition 140,
combined with other Populist-oriented initiatives, has created
a situation in which California's inexperienced, term-limited
legislators are forced to cope as best they can with a jerry--
rigged system of complex and often conflicting initiative
mandates. To say the least, it is a far cry from the rational,
professional model of government the Progressives
envisioned.
With respect to the second substantive concern, minority
rights, it is clear that the direct initiative can be and has been
used to disadvantage minorities.65 The checks-and-balances
system of representative government is designed to
harmonize majority rule with protection of minority rights.
In contrast, the direct initiative system, by bypassing checks
and balances, is weighted heavily toward majority rule at the
expense of certain minorities. Racial minorities,66 illegal
63. See Bruce E. Cain, The Varying Impact of Legislative Term Limits, in
LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS: PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVES 21, 35 (Bernard
Grofman ed., 1996).
64. Nationwide, with the exception of North Dakota, Illinois, and
Mississippi, every state where citizens have the opportunity to place initiatives
on the ballot (i.e., in 21 of the 24 states with the initiative process), term limits
have been adopted. In Washington State, the state supreme court invalidated
the state's voter-approved term limit initiative. See Gerberding v. Munro, 949
P.2d 1366 (1998). By contrast, with the exception of Louisiana, none of the 26
states that lack provisions for initiative lawmaking have adopted term limits
through the legislative process. (The New Hampshire legislature attempted to
impose term limits on the state's representatives in Congress, but not on itself.)
Similarly, despite strong pressure for congressional term limits, members of
Congress have declined to adopt proposals to limit their own terms. Interview
with Paul Jacob, National Director of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. (Feb. 25, 2000).
65. Direct democracy's threat to minority rights is, of course, one of the
primary reasons Madison and most of the other Founders favored a
representative system replete with checks and balances. See generally JAMES
MADISON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JOHN JAY-THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
(Penguin Books 1987) (1788).
66. California initiatives that sought to overturn or block state efforts to
protect racial minorities include Proposition 14 of 1964, which sought to
prohibit state adoption of fair housing laws (invalidated in part by Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)) and Proposition 21 of 1972, which sought to
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immigrants,67 homosexuals,68 and criminal defendants 9 have
been exposed to the electorate's momentary passions as
Californians have adopted a large number of initiatives that
represent Populist backlash against representative
government's efforts to protect or promote the interests of
racial or other minorities. These initiatives should not be too
easily caricatured as majority efforts to tyrannize
minorities-although some may indeed have been motivated
by animus. The broader problem is that initiatives that
directly and differentially affect unpopular minorities can tap
into a strain of anti-minority sentiment in the electorate.0
prohibit forced busing to desegregate public schools (invalidated in part in
Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 315 (1975)). An example
from an earlier period is Proposition 1 of 1920 (the Alien Land Law), which
sought to strengthen prohibitions on land ownership by non-citizens, and was
especially targeted at Japanese farmers. See KEY & CROUCH, supra note 15, at
474-76.
67. The prime example is Proposition 187 of 1994. See infra note 70 and
accompanying text. Other initiatives targeted at immigrants have sought to
persuade the federal government to allow voting materials to be printed in
English only (Proposition 38 of 1984), and to reinforce English as the state's
official language (Proposition 63 of 1986).
68. The recent example is Proposition 22 of 2000, which constitutionalizes
the state's ban on recognition of same-sex marriages. An earlier initiative,
Proposition 6 of 1978, which sought to prohibit homosexuals from teaching in
the public schools, was defeated by the voters. See JONES, supra note 32, at
110.
69. Criminal defendants are an unpopular minority whose rights are at
particular risk in a pure-majoritarian system. In the history of the California
initiative process, six statewide measures have qualities that increase criminal
penalties or restrict defendants' rights. These are the most popular type of
initiative; voters have approved all of them, often by large margins. See id.
70. For a discussion of this problem, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The
Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L REV. 1 (1978).
More specifically, consider Proposition 187 of 1994. Proposition 187 was a
sweeping proposal designed to attack the influx of immigrants into the state
(especially poor, undocumented immigrants from Latin America) and to demand
action from a government that (in the sponsors' view) had been too slow and
indulgent in responding to this crisis. The initiative targeted undocumented
(i.e., "illegal") immigrants but it would also likely impact many in the broader
immigrant population. Many voters did not understand the measure's full
scope and implications, nor the questions regarding its legality. But they
understood the initiative's basic thrust: California was suffering the social and
economic effects of a recent wave of immigration and voters needed to force
government into action to "save our state." Proposition 187's proponents
pounded these Populist and nativist themes in their ballot argument in favor of
the initiative:
Proposition 187 will go down in history as the voice of the people
against an arrogant bureaucracy.
WE CAN STOP ILLEGAL ALIENS.
1058 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
D. Faux Populism?
Some commentators concede that initiative lawmaking in
its current form is far from the Progressive ideal, but argue
that it does not really represent "Populism," either, in that it
is not controlled by "the people," but rather by well-heeled"'
special interests (e.g., big business, big labor, trade
associations) or political parties and public officials;
moreover, some argue, "the people" are merely pawns in the
If the citizens and taxpayers of our state wait for the politicians in
Washington and Sacramento to stop the incredible flow of ILLEGAL
ALIENS, California will be in economic and social bankruptcy....
While our own citizens and legal residents go wanting, those who
choose to enter our country ILLEGALLY get royal treatment at the
expense of the California taxpayer.
IT IS TIME THIS STOPS!...
Should tax paid bureaucrats be able to give sanctuary to those
ILLEGALLY in our country?...
The federal government and state government have been derelict in
their duty to control our borders. It is the role of our government to
end the benefits that draw people from around the world who
ILLEGALLY enter our country. Our government actually entices
them.
Passage of Proposition 187 will send a strong message that California
will no longer tolerate the dereliction of duty by our politicians....
Vote YES on PROPOSITION 187. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH!
The pro-187 campaign aired a television advertisement that showed grainy,
black-and-white footage of immigrants racing across the Mexican border into
California as an announcer ominously intoned: "They keep coming .. " The
anti-187 forces took to the streets. Needless to say, the initiative stirred up
deep passions and polarized the state. Proposition 187 was approved by the
voters (by a 59%-41% vote), but largely invalidated by the federal courts on
federal preemption grounds. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Wilson, No. 94-7569 MRP, 1998 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3368 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13,
1998).
71. The debate over the nature of money's influence in the initiative process
is lively. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note
15, at 263-91 (stating the thesis that wealthy interests control and manipulate
the initiative process); BRODER, supra note 39, at 163-98. However, several
leading scholars take a different view, arguing that while money helps initiative
proponents gain access to the ballot, it generally cannot "buy" initiative
elections; money is a more effective resource for defeating initiatives than in
enacting new ones. See ELISABETH GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST
GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION (1999).
"Certainly the role and influence of economic interest groups is different from
what modern critics charge. Economic groups are limited in their ability to
achieve direct influence over policy, especially direct modifying influence." Id.
at 148. See also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot
Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory, and the First
Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505 (1982) (noting that large expenditures by
opponents can effectively kill initiatives).
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process who are powerless to shape proposals or register their
true preferences.72 It is hard to dispute that the present
initiative system is a distorted form of Populism; interest
groups and public officials, armed with the tools of the
initiative industry, are often the ones driving the process.
Some political scientists, such as Daniel A. Smith, contend
that even modern taxpayer revolts are not truly "Populist"
movements, in that they are often run by professional
organizations and receive financial backing from wealthy
interests." Other political scientists, such as Elisabeth
Gerber, take a slightly different view, suggesting that a
movement is "Populist" if its supporters are "citizen" groups
supporting "broad based" interests, rather than "economic"
groups pursuing "narrow" interests." However, the
important point is not whether a given initiative campaign is
well-financed or whether its objectives are broad or narrow.
Instead, it is more important to note that initiative
proponents are resorting to a process that bypasses
representative government, and which more often than not,
taps into the public's discontent with the government in order
to undermine it. In this respect, the process is clearly
"Populist" in its orientation.
E. Pressure on the Courts
As we have seen, the Populist-oriented initiative process
has successfully bypassed the legislature and executive to
enact laws directly, but it cannot bypass the courts. Courts
are the filter through which all laws must pass, whether
enacted by representative government or by the people
directly." Unlike the legislative process, in which judicial
review is but the last of many redundant institutional checks
72. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112
HARv. L. REV. 434, 436 (1998) (arguing that while single-issue direct democracy
may make people feel that they have more voice in government, it may actually
prevent people from expressing their true priorities and preferences among
issues).
73. See MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 59-76. Note that interest groups'
dominant role in the initiative process is not new; Key and Crouch, writing in
the 1930s, observed this. See KEY & CROUCH, supra note 15, at 572.
74. See DANIEL A. SMITH, TAX CRUSADERS AND THE POLITICS OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY (1998).
75. GERBER, supra note 71.
76. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of
Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986).
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and balances, in the initiative process it is the only effectiveinstitutional check. In fact the courts play an extremely
active and important role in checking and countering the
otherwise unfiltered majoritarian initiative process. InCalifornia, over the past four decades, approximately two-
thirds of all voter-approved initiatives have been challenged
in court, and of those, nearly half have been invalidated in
part or in their entirety." In California and other states,
challenge and invalidation rates vary by subject matter.
Populist-oriented initiatives that affect unpopular minorities
or undermine representative government are frequently
challenged and sometimes invalidated." By contrast,
initiatives that seek to protect the environment (a fairly
common initiative type) rarely face trouble in the courts." In
exercising their power of judicial review, courts have cured
some of the worst abuses of the initiative process but at some
risk. The same Populist impulse that delights in certain
forms of initiative lawmaking is repulsed by judicial review.In the Populist mind, judicial review of ballot initiatives
raises the specter of arrogant, elitist, insular judges usurping
the power from the people themselves. At times, judicialinvalidation of initiatives has led to Populist backlash against
the courts.0
77. See Kenneth P. Miller, The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: ASearch for Standards 12-13 (1999) (unpublished paper presented at the 1999Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA).This study showed that, between 1960 and 1999, California voters adopted 55initiatives; 36 of them (65%) were challenged in court. Of those challenged, 11
were invalidated in part, seven in their entirety, and four cases were stillpending. Fifty-six percent of all challenged initiatives were thus either partly
or entirely invalidated. See id.78. For example, between 1960 and 1998, voters in California, Oregon, andColorado approved 11 initiatives that specifically affected racial or other
minorities. Nine of eleven were challenged in court; five of those (55%) wereinvalidated in part or in their entirety, with one still pending. See id. at 21-22.During the same period, voters in those three states approved 39 initiatives to
reform or constrain representative government. Twenty-six of those were
challenged in court; 16 (77%) of those challenged were invalidated in part or intheir entirety, with five still pending. See id. at 22-23.79. Between 1960 and 1999, voters in California, Oregon, and Colorado
adopted 17 environmental initiatives. Only four were challenged in court and
none were invalidated. See id. at 19-20.80. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining theIndependence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133 (1997). For example, in 1994, Nebraska SupremeCourt Justice David Lanphier authored a decision invalidating the state's termlimit initiative, which Nebraskans had approved by a 70% margin. The
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All of these consequences of the Populist triumph-the
threats to minority rights, the pressure on the courts, and the
undermining of representative government-are disturbing to
commentators from a range of political persuasions who
admire the Progressives' conception of state government. It is
that not-yet-dead Progressive vision that drives efforts to
reform the initiative process.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Since its inception, California's initiative process has
generated controversy, and occasional efforts have been made
to constrain or otherwise change it. During the 1920s, two
attempts were made to raise the signature threshold for tax-
related initiatives, but these and several other early efforts to
restrict the process failed.8' At mid-century, initiative
lawmaking significantly declined in California, and there was
little pressure to reform or constrain the process. Yet if there
ever was a window of opportunity to do so, the 1960s (an era
of representation-reinforcing constitutional reforms) may
have been it. As one member of the 1960s Constitutional
Revision Commission reported, a minority faction tried to
seize the opportunity:
Some members of the constitution revision commission
made several attempts to change radically the provisions
relating to initiatives and referendums. They believed
that petition circulation and ballot proposition campaigns
had become so complex and expensive that it was
discouraging to all except highly organized interest and
pressure groups. It was also argued that the complicated
list of ballot propositions confronting the voter led to
sponsors of the initiative organized a campaign to remove him from the bench.
In 1996, Lanphier was soundly defeated in a retention election. See id. at 1134.
81. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 15, at 44-
45. Voters soundly defeated a 1920 initiative to raise the signature requirement
for tax-related measures to 25% of the vote in the last gubernatorial election, as
well as a subsequent attempt in 1922 to raise the signature requirement to 15%.
In 1948, the legislature proposed and voters approved an amendment to the
constitution to restrict all initiatives to a "single subject." See id. at 46. The
single subject requirement is now contained in article II, section 8(d) of the
California Constitution. For a history of the single subject rule's enactment in
1948 and evolution since, see Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and
the Single Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936, 949-53 (1983). As I will later
discuss, the "single subject rule" has the potential to reduce the scope and
impact of initiative lawmaking, but for decades California courts chose not to
strictly enforce it. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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considerable confusion resulting in a rather doubtful
expression of popular will. Moreover, many commission
members wished to prevent the frequent use of the
initiative to amend the constitution. Hence efforts were
made to abolish the initiative entirely or to require a two-
thirds or 60 percent vote of the people for ratification of a
constitutional initiative. Some also tried for constitutional
change that would require a 10 or 15 percentage of
signatures to discourage the use of the petition device for
constitutional amendments. Although ten to fifteen
commissioners were active in the moves to bring about
further change in the initiative process they did not
muster enough support to muster a majority.82
In fact, the 1960s Commission's reforms made the
initiative process easier, rather than more difficult, by
lowering the signature requirements for initiative statutes
from eight percent to five percent of the votes cast in the last
gubernatorial election." In addition, the 1960s reforms
abolished the indirect initiative; thus, further reinforcing the
legislature-bypassing Populist orientation of the California
initiative.
By the early 1990s, however, following Proposition 13
and the subsequent surge in Populist initiatives, Progressive-
oriented establishment types, academics, civic and
professional leaders, good government reformers, and their
allies in the legislature, had awakened to the threat initiative
lawmaking presents to California's representative
government. They began to organize, draft studies and
reports, and form new commissions.84 Over the past decade, a
82. Bernard L. Hyink, California Revises Its Constitution, W. POL. Q. 637,
645 (Sept. 1969). Hyink noted that those opposed to these changes included
members who represented business interests, members of the legal profession,
and legislators who also served as commission members. They maintained that
the initiative represented a right and a privilege of the people and should not be
withdrawn or subjected to more restriction. See id.
83. See supra note 33.
84. Prominent contributions to the new initiative reform movement
included academic studies and reform proposals by Professors Philip L. Dubois
and Floyd F. Feeney. See IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS:
OPTIONS FOR CHANGE (1992) (a comprehensive study commissioned by the
California Policy Seminar, a joint program of California state government and
the University of California, comparing initiative processes in various states
and proposing reforms to the California initiative process). See also
CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 15 (a comprehensive
study commissioned by the California Commission on Campaign Financing, a
bi-partisan group of elite, Progressive-oriented California academics,
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range of options for reforming the initiative process has
emerged. In this section, I will categorize the most prominent
reform proposals and use the analytical framework developed
above to evaluate them. Specifically, I will assess whether
the proposed reform would serve the goal of constraining
Populist-oriented initiative lawmaking.85
A. Protect the State Constitution
One set of reform proposals is motivated by the concern
that it is too easy to amend the state constitution through the
initiative process and would seek to make such amendments
more difficult. These proposals include increasing the
signature requirements for qualifying an initiative
constitutional amendment, requiring a super-majority vote
for adopting a constitutional amendment, or requiring that
voters approve a constitutional amendment in consecutive
professionals, and business-leaders, critiquing the California initiative process
and proposing reforms); CITIZEN'S COMM'N ON BALLOT INITIATIVES, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE STATEWIDE INITIATIVE PROCESS, SACRAMENTO
(Jan. 1994) [hereinafter CITIZEN'S COMM'N ON BALLOT INITIATIVES] (report of a
bipartisan 15-member commission, chaired by former Legislative Analyst A.
Alan Post, charged by the legislature and the governor to make
recommendations regarding initiative reform).
85. In analyzing reform proposals, it is important to note a category of
reforms that could have a constraining effect on the initiative process but which
is off-limits-namely reforms that restrict money in the process. There is no
doubt that large sums of money fuel the California initiative process. In 1998,
for example, proponents and opponents of California initiatives spent
approximately $250 million in the June and November elections combined. This
compares with $88 million spent by all general election candidates for the U.S.
House of Representatives that year. See GERBER, supra note 71. Moreover,
money can buy access to the ballot. A proponent willing to spend a sufficient
amount is able to qualify almost any measure for the ballot. See Elizabeth
Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845
(1999). In California, the price is currently somewhere between one and two
million dollars. See Gerber, supra note 71. The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that contributions and expenditures in initiative campaigns are protected by the
First Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth. See First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Citizens Against Rent Control v.
City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (These cases follow the logic of Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).). As a result, California cannot constrict the flow of
money that fuels the initiative system. The state may not, for example, limit
initiative campaign expenditures. See Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S.
290 (banning paid gatherers of petition signatures); Myer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414
(1988) (imposing special requirements on paid petition gatherers); Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999). Unless the Court
changes its position on these issues (and there is no indication that it is inclined
to do so), reformers must look elsewhere for ways to constrain the process.
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elections before it can go into effect. These proposals would
sharpen the distinction between the constitution and ordinary
statutes, a distinction that has been blurred since the
enactment of the Populist-oriented 1879 Constitution, and
would make it harder for voters to undermine representative
government by changing its basic structure or by locking in
policies and removing them from legislative control. The
broad Populist objection to these proposals is that the people
should be able to amend the constitution as they see fit, and
it should not be more difficult to amend the constitution by
popular initiative than it is by legislative constitutional
amendment. A more narrow but important objection is that a
simple majority should not be able to enact a constitutional
amendment that imposes a future super-majority
requirement. Some commentators believe that this objection
can be met by requiring that an equal super-majority
approval be required for imposing any future super-majority
requirements.86 There is little doubt, however, that by
protecting the constitution from easy amendment, these
proposals would constrain Populist-oriented initiative
lawmaking.
B. Integrate the Legislature / Allow Amendments
For many Progressive-oriented reformers, connecting the
initiative process more positively to the legislature is the
most important and promising area for reform. They believe
a shift in this direction would improve the quality of the
initiative process by building in some opportunities for
informed deliberation, refinement of proposals, and the like;
prevent the bypassing of representative government by
involving the legislature in the process at the front-end, and
allowing it to modify initiatives after enactment; and increase
the legislature's accountability and responsiveness by
preventing it from punting on controversial matters
addressed by initiatives.87  Proposals to integrate the
legislature into the initiative process take several forms. The
first set of reforms would involve the legislature in the
initiative process before the election, either through pre-
election legislative review of all initiatives, with opportunities
86. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 15, at
344.
87. See SCHRAG, supra note 39, at 216.
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for amendment, or through an optional indirect initiative.
The other set of "integrating" proposals would provide the
legislature opportunities to amend statutory initiatives after
their enactment.
1. Mandatory Pre-election Review with Opportunities to
Amend
Unlike the current initiative system, where initiative
proponents generally do a complete end-run around the
legislature, this reform would require them to submit their
proposal to the legislature for review after the initiative has
qualified for the ballot but prior to the election. Under most
variations of this proposal, the legislature would be required
to hold hearings on the proposed initiative, and there would
be opportunities to amend and refine the proposal. Some
forms of this proposal require the legislature to hold a non-
binding vote on the initiative, which would then be published
in the ballot pamphlet. The main challenge for this reform
proposal is how to structure the amendment process. Some
reformers suggest that the initiative proponent's consent
should not be required,88 but most agree that if the reform has
any hope of success, the proponent must be given final say
over whether to accept or reject amendments. If the
amendment process is not binding, however, some question
whether either initiative proponents or the legislature will
take it seriously, given the general climate of distrust that
exists between the legislature and many initiative
proponents. Some legislators may not want to make
clarifying changes to fix what they consider a "bad bill"; they
may rather hope its flaws make it vulnerable to defeat at the
polls or in court. On the other side, initiative proponents,
who have opted for the costly initiative process rather than
pursuing their proposal through the legislature, may not be
inclined to accept changes suggested by legislators. If
amendments do not require the proponent's consent, the
reform would be a major change and would place a real
constraint on Populist-oriented initiative lawmaking; if
88. See Elisabeth R. Gerber, Reforming the California Initiative Process: A
Proposal to Increase Flexibility and Legislative Accountability, in
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE
EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 291, 308 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds.,
1995).
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consent is optional, however, the reform would be more
neutral, and would not have much constraining effect. The
harder question is whether this reform would have any effect
at all or would just create a pro forma exercise.
2. Optional Indirect Initiative Process
A variation of the "integrating" proposal is to reinstate an
optional indirect process for initiative lawmaking. The
indirect initiative takes several forms in the states where it is
used, but the general idea is that initiative proponents draw
up a measure and gather enough petitions to qualify it for
submission to the legislature, whereupon the legislature has
a certain amount of time to adopt the measure; if it fails to do
so, the measure then goes to the ballot for voter approval or
rejection. Amendments are handled in different ways, but
the general rule is that proponents must consent to them; if
the proponent rejects the amendment, he or she can take the
original measure to the voters for their approval. To create
incentives for initiative proponents to choose the indirect
option instead of the direct initiative, some proposals call for
a two-tier qualification system, with significantly fewer
signatures required to qualify an indirect initiative than a
direct one. As noted above, the California Constitution
provided the indirect initiative option until 1966, when it was
abolished as part of a constitution revision.9" Prior to that,
the mechanism was rarely used, and it tends to be disfavored
in states where it is available.91 The challenge now would be
to create structures and incentives to make an indirect
initiative system work in a climate where there is distrust
between initiative proponents and the legislature. Populist-
oriented initiative lawmaking would not be constrained by
the introduction of this option, as long as it is voluntary and
the direct initiative option remains freely available. If the
incentives are structured correctly, it might nudge the
89. See, e.g., Memorandum from Gary K. Hart to Speaker's Initiative
Commissioners, Regarding Indirect Initiative 2 (Feb. 23, 2001) (noting that "[in
order to encourage initiative seekers to consider seriously the indirect initiative,
most proponents believe there ought to be some lesser signature threshold to
qualify for the ballot (somewhere in the 50-80% range) and/or some additional
time to gather signatures (currently 150 days, perhaps adding another 30-50
days").
90. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
91. See DuBois & Feeney, supra note 84, at 23.
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initiative process in the direction of the Progressive vision.
3. Post-enactment Amendment
California is the only initiative state that prohibits the
legislature from amending or repealing voter-approved
statutory initiatives.92  Most initiative states allow the
legislature to amend or repeal statutory initiatives
immediately after enactment, just as it can any other
statute.93 These states recognize that statutes by nature often
require amendment as circumstances change, and the
legislature should have the flexibility to make modifications
to them even if they were enacted by initiative. The
California rule, however, locks in initiative-made policies and
thereby significantly undermines the legislature's authority
and flexibility. The special status given to initiative statutes
in California is clearly driven by distrust of the legislature,
even though most legislators would be very wary of
significantly changing or repealing a voter-approved initiative
as is evidenced in states where they have the ability to do so.94
Especially given the extensive nature of statutory initiative
lawmaking in California over the past three decades, this is
an area particularly ripe for reform. Again, reformers need to
anticipate unintended consequences; specifically, if the
system is reformed so that statutory initiatives can be
amended or repealed without voter approval but
constitutional initiatives cannot, initiative proponents will
have greater incentives to pursue constitutional initiatives
rather than statutory initiatives for ordinary policies.
Accordingly, proposals to give the legislature the ability to
92. See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 10(c); see also supra note 28 (regarding
Arizona's rules). Under the California rule, post-election legislative
amendments to initiatives are forbidden unless the initiative itself expressly
permits amendment. In recent years, a majority of initiatives that have
qualified for the ballot have authorized amendments, but usually only by a
supermajority, and only to further the purposes of the initiative. The initiative
sponsor retains discretion over whether or not to allow amendments, however,
and many important initiatives have not so provided. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N
ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 15, at 94-95; Gerber, supra note 88, at
293.
93. A few states require a waiting period (e.g., Alaska, amend anytime but
no repeal for two years (ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6); Washington, no repeal for
two years, amend or repeal within two years with two-thirds vote of legislature
(WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(c)).) See also Dubois & Feeney, supra note 84, at 45.
94. See DuBois & Feeney, supra note 84, at 45-46; see also KEY & CROUCH,
supra note 15, at 481-87.
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modify statutory initiatives should be coupled with proposals
to make enactment of constitutional initiatives more difficult.
Pursued in tandem, these reforms would place a significant
constraint on Populist-oriented initiative lawmaking.
C. Regulate Access to the Ballot
Deciding how high to make the hurdle for qualifying an
initiative for the ballot is important, and it is an area where
Progressive-oriented reformers engage in a lot of muddled
thinking. Populists act consistently with their principles
when they suggest that the qualification process should be
made easier, for example by ensuring that signature-
gatherers have free access to public places, that the number
of signatures be low and the time for qualification long, and
that new technologies such as electronic signature-gathering
be allowed. But some Progressives agree that the
qualification hurdle should be lowered.95 Progressives who
take this view seek to help citizen groups that cannot afford
paid petition gatherers gain access to the ballot. Aware that
current Supreme Court decisions prevent them from
restricting paid petition gatherers, these Progressives have
decided to try to level the playing field downward. However,
given the overwhelming Populist orientation of the California
initiative process, it is foolhardy to make access to the system
easier, at least until some of the constraining reforms are
achieved. The real question is whether to invest limited
"reform resources" on raising the qualification hurdle. At a
minimum, Progressives should fend off proposals that could
make access to the ballot easier, such as Internet signature
gathering,96 unless those proposals are carefully countered by
constraining reforms.
D. Require Pre-election Legal Vetting
In California, approximately two-thirds of all voter-
approved initiatives are challenged in court and of those,
95. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 15,
at 343; CITIZEN'S COMM'N ON BALLOT INITIATIVES, supra note 84, at 5 (both
calling for extending the qualification period from 150 to 180 days).
96. This idea is currently being studied by the California Secretary of State.
See California Secretary of State, California Digital Signature Regulations
(visited May 23, 2001) <http://www.ss.ca.gov/digsig/regulations.htm>.
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nearly half are invalidated in part or in their entirety.9" As
discussed earlier, California initiatives' Populist orientation
makes many of them vulnerable to legal attack. Many voters
are frustrated when a court invalidates an initiative after the
election. Some reformers believe that pre-election review of
initiatives (either by the courts or by the attorney general)
would help remedy this situation, by identifying legal flaws
before the fact. In theory, this proposal sounds appealing, but
in practice it raises new concerns.
1. Pre-election Review by Courts
An initiative raises three primary types of legal issues: 1)
has it met procedural requirements, such as the rules for
qualification? 2) does it fail to meet subject matter
requirements, such as the single subject rule? and 3) does it
violate substantive state or federal constitutional provisions,
such as equal protection or due process?9" The first type of
legal challenge is best resolved prior to the election, and is
generally handled by the lower courts, which usually defer to
the judgments of the secretary of state. The real questions
about the court's appropriate pre-election role arise with
respect to the other two categories. The California Supreme
Court has refused to rule prior to the election on a measure's
constitutional validity.99 There are good reasons for this,
including rules against issuing advisory opinions, the doctrine
of ripeness, respect for separation of powers, and general
considerations of judicial economy. ' The general principle is
that courts should not intervene in the lawmaking process to
render a judgment about the constitutional validity of a
proposal that may or may not become law.' The question of
whether courts should review initiatives for subject matter
compliance prior to the election is a harder one.' 2 In some
97. See Miller, supra note 77, at 12-13.
98. See James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-election Judicial
Review of Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 298, 302 (1989).
99. See Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1 (1982) (rejecting pre-election review
of Proposition 8 of 1982).
100. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 98, at 304-13.
101. See id.
102. Several commentators advocate pre-election review for compliance with
subject-matter requirements. See id. at 314 (arguing for pre-election review for
compliance with subject-matter requirements, but not for substantive validity);
Douglas C. Michael, Pre-election Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative in Voter
Protection, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1216 (1983) (recommending pre-election review for
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respects, pre-election review for subject matter compliance
raises some of the same concerns as reviewing it for
substantive validity (e.g., it runs counter to notions of judicial
economy to review a proposed measure that voters may never
approve). Especially in the initiative context, the court's
political capital is precious, and should be expended with
care. In the past, the California Supreme Court has been
wary of invalidating initiatives prior to the election for
violation of subject requirements, 103 but there have been
exceptions °4 A recent example is the California Supreme
Court's decision to invalidate Proposition 24 prior to the
March 2000 election for violation of the single subject rule.0 °
The decision was controversial because it seemed to set a
tougher standard for single subject review,0 6 but perhaps
even more so because the court was inserting itself in the
initiative process prior to the election. 10
7
The question for reformers is whether to require the
supreme court to conduct pre-election review of review
initiatives. Several initiative states have institutionalized
pre-election judicial review, at least with respect to whether
the measure complies with the proper subject matter
restrictions. In Florida, for example, the state supreme court
reviews all initiatives before they are cleared to go on the
ballot.' The Florida court plays a significant constraining
subject-matter compliance); Michael J. Farrell, The Judiciary and Popular
Democracy: Should Courts Review Ballot Measures Prior to Elections?, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 919 (1985) (recommending pre-election review of "threshold
requirements").
103. See Brosnahan, 31 Cal. 3d 1.
104. E.g., McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330 (1948) (invalidating, prior to
the election, the proposed "ham and eggs" initiative for violation of the no-
revision rule).
105. See Senate v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142, 1167 (1999).
106. See id. at 1176. In dissent, Justice Joyce L. Kennard (joined by Justice
Janice R. Brown), distinguished between this opinion and earlier, more "lax"
enforcement of the single subject rule. See also Gerald F. Uelmen, Taming the
Initiative, CAL. LAW., Aug. 2000, at 46, 49.
107. See Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1169-72 (criticizing the court's pre-election
review of Proposition 24 as a "rush to decision"). Justice Kennard argued that
in the absence of a clear showing of invalidity (which she said did not exist in
this case), it is more appropriate to review a decision after an election than
before. Id. at 1169 (citing Brosnahan, 31 Cal. 3d at 4).
108. Article IV, section 10 of the Florida Constitution and section 16.061 of
the Florida Statutes direct the attorney general to seek an advisory opinion
from the state supreme court regarding compliance with single subject and
titling rules.
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role in the state's initiative process, by strictly enforcing the
Florida Constitution's single subject rule and thereby
preventing many measures from ever reaching the ballot. For
example, it has prevented Ward Connerly from placing on the
Florida ballot initiatives to dismantle the state's affirmative
action programs, holding that the measures violated the state
constitution's single subject rule even though Connerly had
divided what was essentially the same proposal as
California's Proposition 209 into four separate initiatives. 9
The Florida court has taken heat for playing such an active
"gatekeeping" role in the state's initiative process.
California's reformers should be wary of requiring a pre-
election role for the state supreme court. As the only
institutional check on initiatives, the court already plays a
crucial role in the process. While institutionalizing pre-
enactment screening by the court could certainly have a
constraining effect on Populist-oriented initiative lawmaking,
it would make the court an even more constant participant in
initiative controversies, would strain its docket, and would
invite new pressures on the institution."' Before requiring
the court to assume this burden, reformers should consider
other alternatives for constraining Populist-oriented initiative
lawmaking.
2. Pre-election Review by the Attorney General
As an alternative to mandating pre-election review of
initiatives by the courts, some reformers propose that the
attorney general be charged with assessing the measure's
109. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Amendment to Bar
Government from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public
Education (and related initiatives), 778 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2000) [hereinafter
Advisory Opinion].
110. After the Florida court blocked his initiative from the ballot, Connerly
said, "[I] f ever there were a case of a judicial malpractice, this is it ... I swear
to you, if I were a resident of Florida, I'd start an impeachment process
tomorrow. It's such a partisan court, it's unbelievable." Janet Marshall, Court
Kills Affirmative Action Vote, LAKELAND LEDGER, July 14, 2000, at B1.
111. For discussion of the political pressures state court judges face
(especially in the context of reviewing popular initiatives), see Uelmen, supra
note 80, at 1149 ("Judges considering the constitutionality of voter efforts are
not likely to be blind to the specter of an interest group structure energized to
carry out the same kind of voter campaign in displacing offending judges that
was used in getting the plebiscite passed in the first place."). See also Julian N.
Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1580-83 (1990);
Miller, supra note 77.
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validity prior to the election.112 As in some other states, the
attorney general could be given the power to remove
initiatives from the ballot for failure to comply with certain
rules (violation of the single subject rule, etc.).13
Alternatively, the attorney general could issue voters a non-
binding advisory opinion regarding the legality of the
initiative, a role that would be more "informational" than
"constraining." Since in California the attorney general is a
partisan official, the office's present role in the initiative
process, drafting the ballot title, is already controversial, and
some reformers want to shift that responsibility away from
the attorney general to another office, such as the Legislative
Analyst. Giving the attorney general the power to keep
initiatives off the ballot by vetting them for compliance with
subject requirements would generate further controversy."'
Despite these problems, however, from an institutional
perspective it is better to vest primary responsibility for this
task in the attorney general than in the courts.
In sum, while institutionalizing pre-election subject-
112. See Memorandum from Joe Remcho to David Abel, Chair, and Members,
Speaker's Commission on the Initiative Process, Regarding Post-Election
Review Committee (Feb. 26, 2001). In this memorandum, Commissioner
Remcho suggests that the attorney general review initiatives for compliance
with single subject requirements. If the attorney general finds that the
initiative does not comply with the single subject rule, he or she may not
prepare a title and summary for the measure. The Commission subsequently
explored alternatives to this proposal, such as vesting this role in a panel that
consists of the attorney general and other officials. See also infra note 141 and
accompanying text.
113. Several states provide for pre-election administrative review (usually by
the attorney general) for compliance with subject matter requirements. See
DuBois & Feeney, supra note 84, at 30-36. California presently does not have
such a rule. See Schmitz v. Younger, 21 Cal. 3d 90, 92-93 (1978) (holding that
the attorney general has no power to deny a title and summary where an
initiative's validity is doubtful).
114. The attorney general's existing pre-election role (setting ballot titles for
initiatives) is already controversial. Some initiative proponents believe the
language of the ballot title is essential to an initiative's success or failure and
that attorneys general have exhibited bias in their drafting of titles.
Accordingly, they have sought to shift the task of drafting the ballot title from
the attorney general to what they presume to be a more "neutral" body. See
Proceedings of the Speaker's Commission on the California Initiative Process
(Dec. 18, 2000). Those who distrust the attorney general worry that if given the
power to bar initiatives from the ballot, he or she would become in effect an
"initiative czar." See comments by Commissioner Colleen McAndrews,
Proceedings of the Speaker's Commission on the California Initiative Process
(Feb. 26, 2001). However, since the attorney general is accountable to the
statewide electorate, voters could punish any abuse of discretion.
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matter review is potentially an effective way to constrain
Populist-oriented initiative lawmaking, conveying that
responsibility, especially to the court, raises practical
concerns.
3. Improve Information
Some Progressive reformers pin their hopes for
improving the initiative process on increasing citizens'
information as they participate in the process. Improving
information takes many forms, including increasing
disclosure of the financial interests supporting or opposing an
initiative,"' tinkering with the ballot pamphlet to make it
more accessible and informative to the average 
voter,116
setting up public hearings on initiatives,11 ' and jawboning
journalists to provide more complete coverage of ballot
measures."' These proposals may improve, to some degree,
the quality of public discernment regarding initiatives and
are likely to be relatively non-controversial. However, if they
are non-controversial, it is in part because they do not go very
far in constraining the Populist initiative process. Indeed,
the danger in focusing exclusively on these kinds of proposals
is that they can become palliatives that divert focus from
reforms that more directly address the threat that Populist-
oriented initiative lawmaking poses to representative
government.
E. Restrict Scope
The California Constitution contains provisions that at
least potentially restrict the scope of Populist-oriented
initiative lawmaking. They include the single subject rule,
which requires that initiatives, as well as ordinary
115. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 15, at
344-45; DuBois & Feeney, supra note 84, at 170-72, CITIZEN'S COMM'N ON
BALLOT INITIATIVES, supra note 84, at 5-8. If reformers cannot reduce the
money in the initiative process, at least they can try to reduce its influence.
116. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 15, at
345; DuBois & Feeney, supra note 84, at 170.
117. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 15, at
341; see also Leroy J. Tornquist, Direct Democracy in Oregon: Some Suggestions
for Change, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 675 (1998) (promoting a Citizen's Initiative
Review Committee to assess all qualified initiatives and provide impartial
review).
118. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 15, at
10732001]
1074 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
legislation, embrace no more than one "subject,"19 and the no-
revision rule, which states that initiative constitutional
amendments can only amend, not revise, the constitution. 20
The manner in which these rules are interpreted and
enforced can have enormous impact on initiative
lawmaking. 2'
1. Single Subject Rule
California adopted the single subject rule in 1948, and
most other state constitutions also contain single subject
requirements.'22  The generally-stated purpose of single
subject rules is to prevent logrolling and to reduce voter
confusion. 2' Clearly, strict application of the rule also can
serve another purpose, which is to constrain initiative
lawmaking. If a court decides that an initiative violates the
single subject rule, it will invalidate the entire measure.2 4 In
the past, the California Supreme Court has chosen not to
enforce this rule strictly; for years, it rejected single subject
challenges to sweeping, complex initiatives.2 ' In adopting a
119. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
120. See id. art. XVIII.
121. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 81. Professor Lowenstein has argued
that the single subject rule allows for a wide range of interpretation because the
concept of "subject" is "infinitely malleable." He notes:
If we examine only the words to the single subject rule, two extreme
interpretations are possible. On the one hand, we might plausibly
conclude that no initiative could possibly violate the rule. Consider the
most bizarre assortment of unrelated provisions you can imagine. The
mere fact that the provisions have been put together in one measure
makes them constitute a "single subject," if only for purposes of
discussion and study. On the other hand, the language of the single
subject rule also permits an interpretation that would abolish the
initiative process altogether. That is, it is impossible to conceive of a
measure that could not be broken down into parts, which could in turn
be regarded as single subjects.
Id. at 967.
122. See Anne G. Campbell, Unintended Consequences of the Single Subject
Rule for Ballot Initiatives: the Judiciary's Influence over a Legislative Power,
Paper Presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science
Association 6 (Mar. 24-26, 2000).
123. See Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 954.
124. See, e.g., Senate v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142 (1999) (removing Proposition
24 in its entirety from the ballot for violation of the single subject rule).
125. See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208 (1978) (upholding Proposition 13 of 1978 against
single subject challenge); Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25
Cal. 3d 33 (1979) (upholding the Political Reform Act, Proposition 9 of 1974,
against a similar challenge); Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236 (1982)
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"liberal construction" of the single subject rule, the court
stated, "Our society being complex, the rules governing it,
whether adopted by legislation or initiative, will necessarily
be complex. Unless we are to cripple use of the initiative, risk
of confusion must be borne."'26 Based on this logic, the court
has interpreted the single subject rule to require only that the
elements of an initiative be "reasonably germane" or
"reasonably related to a common theme or purpose"; it is not
necessary that they "effectively interlock in a functional
relationship."'27 This generous approach sparked controversy.
In Brosnahan v. Brown,28 dissenting Justices Bird, Mosk, and
Broussard argued that through its liberal construction of the
single subject rule, the court had effectively repealed it.' 29
Nevertheless, a majority of the court was committed to
accommodating the initiative process: "It is our solemn duty
to jealously guard the initiative power," the court repeated in
a number of cases, "it being one of the most precious rights of
our democratic process. ""' Reformers concerned about the
increasing impact of Populist-oriented initiative lawmaking,
however, thought the single subject rule should be made more
restrictive. In 1997, State Senators Karnette, Lewis, Maddy,
and Polanco introduced SCA 5, a constitutional amendment
that would have tightened the single subject rule for
initiatives by requiring not only that each provision be
reasonably germane to the general purpose of the measure,
but that each provision also be "reasonably interdependent"
with all other provisions."' The measure failed to win two-
thirds approval in the legislature but the idea of amending
the constitution to give "teeth" to the single subject rule has
received new consideration by the current initiative reform
commission.'32  At a recent commission meeting,
Commissioner Joseph Remcho presented a memorandum
reviewing the history of the California Supreme Court's
(upholding the "Victims' Bill of Rights," Proposition 8 of 1982, against a similar
challenge).
126. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d at 41-42.
127. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 512-13 (1991).
128. 32 Cal. 3d 236 (1982).
129. See id. at 262.
130. See, e.g., Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 248; Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at
241.
131. California Senate Constitutional Amendment 5 (1997).
132. See Remcho, supra note 112.
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interpretation of the single subject rule, and proposing a
change:
Article II. section 8(d) currently provides:
An initiative measure embracing more than one subject
may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.
Historically the purpose of the single subject rule has
been to avoid "logrolling," forcing people to vote in favor of
one thing in order to get another. On paper, the
prohibition against measures embracing more than one
subject is as strong as anything in the Constitution. Not
only do such measures violate the Constitution, but the
Constitution also provides that they may not even be
submitted to the electors.
Unfortunately, the modern history of enforcement of the
rule has not been good. This stems in large part from the
fact that the early modern cases came up in the context of
wildly popular measures. Two appellate courts
invalidated measures in the 1980s, but the Supreme Court
had never taken one off the ballot until last year...
I believe that many measures survived because the
courts were asked to invalidate measures that had secured
overwhelming support by the voters. The Supreme Court
often stated that it would give extra leeway to measures
passed by the voters. On the other hand, courts were
reluctant to take measures off before a popular vote,
because it would deprive voters of their right to choose
and because the case would not even come back to the
courts if the measure failed to pass.
Strengthening the single subject rule would ensure that
voters get a simple clean choice at the polls: an up or down
vote on a measure, unencumbered by provisions included
solely to secure more votes.
One proposal considered by the committee could be met
by adding the following italicized language to article II,
section 8(d) so that it reads:
An initiative embracing more than one subject may
not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.
All of a measure's provisions must be both
functionally related and reasonably germane to each
other. The Attorney General may not prepare a title
or summary for any measure not meeting these
requirements, but shall permit a proponent to submit
1076 [Vol. 41
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separate initiatives for each subject.
This language would deal with the problem in two ways:
1. By requiring a measure to be both reasonably
germane and functionally related it uses the
standards enunciated by the courts, but adds some
teeth to the rule. More importantly, it frees the
courts of modern precedents in which many measures
that reasonable people would see as embracing more
than one subject were upheld. It allows the court to
apply the rule in light of the way in which initiatives
have come to be used in modern California.
2. By requiring the Attorney General to insist on
separate measures, it provides a mechanism to
resolve the single subject issue well in advance of
significant expenditures by proponents and action by
133the people ....
Remcho's proposal would likely have another effect, as
well: by combining a tougher single subject rule with binding
pre-election review, the proposal would constrain the
initiative process. Florida provides an example of how this
combination of pre-election review and strict single subject
enforcement can prevent measures from reaching the 
ballot.3 1
Stricter enforcement of the single subject requirement is
consistent with recent trends in several initiative states. In
the past few years, a number of state supreme courts have
noticeably tightened enforcement of single subject rules or
similar requirements."3 In California, the court's recent
133. Id.
134. In Florida, where initiatives are available only to amend the
constitution (but not to enact statutes), the supreme court interprets the state's
single subject rule strictly. In searching for a violation of the single subject
rule, the court looks to see whether the initiative affects multiple "functions of
government." Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 990 (Fla. 1984). This standard,
according to one member of the court, is "practically insurmountable." Evans v.
Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1360 (Fla. 1984) (Shaw, J., concurring).
135. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 11 P.3d 762
(Wash. 2000) (invalidating Washington Initiative 695, a Populist-oriented tax
limitation initiative, for violation of the state's single subject rule and on other
grounds); Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49 (Or. 1998) (invalidating Oregon
Amendment 40, a "tough on crime" constitutional initiative, and establishing a
new, strict interpretation of the state's "separate vote requirement" for
constitutional amendments); Marshall v. State, 975 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1999)
(following Oregon's Armatta rule); Aisenberg v. Campbell, 975 P.2d 180 (Colo.
1999) (excluding from the ballot an initiative for violation of the state's single
subject rule); Advisory Opinion, supra note 109 (invalidating four Ward
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decision in Senate v. Jones'36 signals that it may be shifting
away from its liberal interpretation of the single subject rule.
Even though the court did not expressly alter its standard of
review, 137 observers believe the majority's decision represents
a new, more aggressive approach. 3 ' Some commentators do
not want the court to give the single subject rule real teeth,
because selective application of a strict rule would result in
arbitrary invalidation of initiatives, and consistent
application of it would preclude complex initiatives of all
types, even "good" ones. 9 In the face of Populism's threat,
however, it may be necessary for the California Supreme
Court to make that bargain. If so, it needs to be
acknowledged that an aggressive approach to single subject
rule enforcement would place the court in the position of
"initiative watchdog," thus exposing it to public backlash.4 '
2. No Revision Rule
An alternative constitutional provision that could be
invoked to restrict initiative lawmaking is the "no-revision
rule." Unlike the single subject rule which applies to both
initiative statutes and initiative constitutional amendments,
this rule applies only to initiative constitutional amendments.
As with the single subject rule, the California Supreme Court
has interpreted this rule liberally.'4 ' The court should
reconsider this position. Enforcing the no-revision rule more
strictly could have two salutary effects: it would constrain
initiative lawmaking, and it would sharpen the distinction
between constitutional initiatives and initiative statutes, an
important reform objective.
Connerly-sponsored anti-affirmative action initiatives for violation of Florida's
single subject rule on other grounds).
136. 21 Cal. 4th 1142 (1999).
137. See id. at 1167-68 (holding that the initiative fails to satisfy the
"reasonably germane" test).
138. See, e.g., Uelmen, supra note 106.
139. See Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 964-70. A further unintended
consequence, Lowenstein notes, is that initiative drafters will try to manipulate
provisions of an initiative to create "artificial interdependencies" in order to
meet the stricter single subject standard. Id. at 965-66.
140. See Uelmen, supra note 80.
141. See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208 (1978) (upholding Proposition 13 of 1978 against
the claim that it violated the no-revision rule); Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492(1991) (upholding Proposition 140 of 1990 against a similar challenge).
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The following chart summarizes the major reform
proposals discussed above, and indicates whether their effect
on Populist-oriented initiative lawmaking would be
"constraining," "neutral," or "expanding."
Proposal Effect
Protect Constitution
Impose higher requirements for initiative Constraining
constitutional amendments
-supermajority vote
-consecutive elections
Involve Legislature / Allow
Amendment Neutral, if proponent
retains control of
proposal, and if delay
Require legislature to review all 
does not pose a
initiatives before the election; allow constraint.
opportunities to amend initiative with Otherwise,
proponent's consent or to enact constraining.
alternative
Provide indirect initiative option Neutral, if optional
Permit legislative amendment of Constraining
statutory initiatives after enactment
107920011
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Restrict Content
Tighten single subject rule, no revision Constraining
rule
Modify Petition Rules Constraining
Raise the signature-gathering hurdle
(larger number or shorter period)
Lower the signature-gathering hurdle Expanding
(lesser number or longer period)
Allow e-signatures Expanding
Require Legal Vetting
Require pre-election legal review Constraining, if
-by courts binding
-by attorney general
Inform Voters
Increase information and disclosure Neutral
(especially regarding money)
To summarize this perspective on initiative reforms, the
main goal is not to make the initiative process easier or more
accessible: it is to constrain Populist-oriented initiative
lawmaking. Restricting the role of money in the process is
not a viable option, due to U.S. Supreme Court decisions."
Instead, the leading elements of the "initiative constraining"
agenda should be: 1) to distinguish more clearly between
constitutional and statutory initiative lawmaking by making
initiative constitutional amendments more difficult to enact,
and initiative statutes less "constitution-like"; 2) to integrate
142. See supra note 85.
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the legislature into the initiative process by allowing
statutory initiatives to be amended before the election and
after enactment; and 3) to tighten the scope of initiatives
through stricter enforcement of constitutional constraints on
initiative lawmaking. Proposals to improve voter information
have merit and are non-controversial but do not have a
significant constraining effect and so should not be the
reformers' primary objective. Finally, pre-election legal
vetting, by either the supreme court or the attorney general,
is a constraining change but raises practical concerns and
should be approached with care.
V. PROSPECTS
Is this agenda for constraining the initiative process
achievable? What are the obstacles to these reforms and
what conditions are necessary to overcome them?
Given the extent to which the California initiative
process is entrenched, any significant change to it would be a
major achievement. It is generally understood that major
constitutional change can only occur when conditions are
ripe, when events create a "window of opportunity." Professor
Bruce Ackerman has described such situations at the federal
level as "constitutional moments."' According to Ackerman's
definition, in "constitutional moments," a period of agitation
leads to transformative change, which survives a period of
testing, earns broad and deep support, and is locked in place;
the new principles cannot easily be dislodged.' History thus,
can be understood as periods of "normal politics" occasionally
interrupted by more intense and compelling moments of
"higher lawmaking." 4' Ackerman argues that at the federal
level, the list of "constitutional moments" is short-the
founding, the reconstruction period, and the New Deal.'46
California's constitution is far more malleable than the
federal constitution, so this dualism may not be neatly
applicable to the California context. Nevertheless, it is
perhaps useful to consider moments in California history
143. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 4-5 (1998).
144. See id.
145. Id. at 6; see also Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Principles of State
Constitutional Design, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note
25, at 9, 12-13.
146. See ACKERMAN, supra note 143, at 7.
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where there was significant and lasting constitutional
change. The drafting and adoption of California's
constitution of 1879 would qualify, since it established the
Populist conception of the constitution as a means for locking
in policies and binding representative government. 147  The
Progressive amendments of 1911-including, but not limited
to, the introduction of direct democracy-would also certainly
meet the definition.48 The period of the mid-1960s, when the
legislature was reapportioned on a one-person-one-vote
basis,'49 and then fully professionalized through constitutional
revision," °  constitutes another "constitutional moment"
although that era's impact was undermined by the neo-
Populism that followed shortly thereafter. Indeed, the
adoption of Proposition 13 was such a watershed event in the
state's history that it probably qualifies as a "constitutional
moment" as well: it both locked in lasting change in state
government and ushered in an era of Populist-oriented
initiative lawmaking.
15
'
Constraining California's initiative system in the manner
I have described would seem to require a "constitutional
moment" of almost equal magnitude. Absent such a moment,
reformers can make incremental change at the margins of the
process, but major reforms are unlikely, given the
romanticized and deeply entrenched nature of the system."2
Of the "constitutional moments" described above, the one that
147. See Persily, supra note 5, at 20-21 (applying the concept of
"constitutional moment" to the founding of western states).
148. California historian Kevin Starr describes the years between 1910 and
1913 as a "second founding" which "seemed like the very recreation of the
political and social order of California." STARR, supra note 18, at 254.
149. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring that state
legislative districts be apportioned on an equal population basis. Prior to that
decision, rural areas of the state had been significantly over-represented in the
legislature at the expense of urban areas; the shift in apportionment helped
facilitate the professionalization of the legislature). See also Peverill Squire,
The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly, 54 J.
POL. 1026 (1992).
150. See Lee, supra note 33, for a historical perspective of the 1960s reforms.
151. See SCHRAG, supra note 39, at 188-89.
152. See John Ferejohn, Reforming the Initiative Process, in CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 25, at 313 (discussing the difficulties of
altering the initiative process: "Reforming the initiative process can be
politically dangerous because such attempts often appear to be undemocratic
and high-handed. The initiative seems so obviously democratic and self-
justifying, that those who would limit it appear to be self seeking, corrupt,
arrogant, or simply out of touch with the people.").
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serves as the most hopeful precedent occurred during the
1960s, during which a group of reformers worked for years to
build public support to improve government by strengthening
the legislature.' Now, reformers have to convince the public
that they can improve government by constraining the
initiative process. Any measure that is seen as "legislature-
enhancing" at the expense of "the people" faces hard
sledding."' This is not news to reformers. Serious efforts to
propose reforms to California's initiative process have been
underway for a decade, yet nothing has happened. So far,
there has not been a sufficient "window of opportunity" to
make significant Progressive-oriented change. Instead, we
are still living in the Populist Era ushered in by Proposition
13 and reconfirmed by a series of subsequent statewide votes,
particularly the enactment of Proposition 140. There is much
evidence to suggest that the public remains distrustful of
representative government, and little evidence to suggest
that it would embrace serious efforts to strengthen it by
constraining the people's initiative power."'
If it is true that we are not living in a moment that will
permit significant "initiative constraining" proposals,
reformers may have to lower their expectations and either
seek more incremental reforms or else wait and work to
create a more propitious moment. On one point, however,
reformers should be clear: the most important principle is to
do no harm. Given the Populist-orientation of California's
initiative process, they should resist any changes that expand
it. Any reforms that emerge from current or future
commissions should seek to constrain Populism, and redirect
the initiative process toward a vision that enhances rather
than undermines the institutions of representative
government.
153. See Hyink, supra note 82, at 637.
154. See Ferejohn, supra note 152, at 313-14.
155. According to surveys, Californians strongly support the initiative
process and believe that voters making choices at the ballot box are more likely
than the governor and the legislature to solve the state's problems. See Mark
Baldassare, PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government, in
SAN FRANCISCO: THE PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA 4 (2001).
Recent polling by Baldassare shows public support for increasing disclosure of
financial backers of initiatives as well as for pre-election review of initiatives to
avoid drafting errors and problems with ballot language and to flag "legal or
constitutional problems." Id. at 416. There is no evidence, however, that the
public would support reform that significantly constrained the process.
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In the meantime, if the moment is not right for
constraining reforms, the state supreme court has a duty to
become the "watchdog" of the initiative process. More
aggressive enforcement of existing constitutional rules for
initiative lawmaking, e.g., the single subject and no-revision
rules, can have significant constraining effects. Progressive
reformers must recognize, however, that the court assumes a
political risk by more aggressively checking initiative
lawmaking. The same Populist impulse that currently drives
the initiative process can also be directed against the court.
Accordingly, reformers should not just comfortably rely on the
court to protect California's representative government from
the state's Populist-oriented initiative process, but instead
should work to create the necessary conditions for
constraining reforms.
